Vue d'Amérique by Caws, Peter
IVUE D'AMeRIQUE
TRum AHn PRESBNCB: POBne IMAGINATION
AND MATllEMATICAL PHYSICS IN GASTON BACHBLARD
In the stacks of the Sterling library at Yale University, thirty
years ago, I happened as a graduate student in philosophy to be
reading Gaston Bacbelardts L'activite rationaliste de la physique
contemporainewhile my closest friend at the time, a graduate student
in French, happened to be reading bis L'eau et les reves. This
coincidence was gratifying, although it did not seem remarkable;
neither of us fouod tbe otber's interest alien. I refer to it not from
romaotic nostalgia but because it now occurs to me that this personal
conjunction of science and the humanities antedated by live years
C.P. Snow's Tbc Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution1, an
essay which suggested that it ought to have seemed remarkable, since
according to Snow a great gulf was, if not fIXed, at least being busily
dug, between the domains to which these worb belonged. Of course
Snow believed ratber complacently that he bimself embodied a rare
and difficult combination of the two. but be seems not to bave
realized how thoroughly his problem had been aoticipated, or how
satisfactorily it bad been solved, by a professor at tbe Sorbonne who
bad begun his career as a provincial French postman.
As far-as that goes my own double interest, in science and in
poetry, antedated by many years my encounter with Bachelard.
Bachelard somewhere acknowledges a debt to bis fatber in tbe matter
of building fires; I owe a debt to mine botb for his habit of reciting
Milton and for bis curiosity about the sciences,especially astronomy.
He possessed some of the works of tbose great popular writers, both
1 c.r. Snow, Tbc Two Cultutes and the ScientiJic Revolution. Cambridge: The
Univeraity Press. 1959.
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distinguished scientists, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthu'r Eddington,
and I read them while I was still in school; in the lattersj s Tbe
Nature oE the Physical World is a passage that Bachelard may have
known and would certainly have liked. Une day," says EddirigtoD,
, happened to be occupied with the subject of 'Generation of Waves
by Wind.' I took down the standard treatise on hydrodynamics, aod
under that heading I read" land there follows a. paragraph of
mathematical symbols]:
And so on for lWo pages. At tbe end it is made·clear tbat a wind
of leIS tban half a mile an bour willleave tbe lurface unrumed. At
a mile an hour tbe lurface 11 covered witb minute corrusatioDs due
to capillary waves wbicb decay immediately tbe disturbin8 cause
ceaael. At two miles an bour the sravity wavel appear. AI tbe
autbor modestly concludea: 'Our theoretical investigatioDa sive
considerable insigbt into tbe incipient stages ofwave-formation.' On
another occasion tbe same IUbject of 'Generation of Waves by
Wind' was in my mind; but this time anoitber book was more
appropriate, and I read:
There are waters blown by chansins windl to laushter
And IIt by the rieh Ikies, all day. And after
Frost, with a gcsture, alays tbe waves that dance
And wandering loveliness. He leaves a wbite
Unbroken story, a gatbered radiance.
A widtb. a shining peace, uoder the niSbt.
The magie words brins back the scene. Asain we feel
Nature drawing close to us. unitins witb os, tUI we are filled witb tbe
gladness of the waves dancins in the sunsbine, witb tbe awe of tbe
moonlight on the frozen lake. These were not moments wben We
fell below ourselves. We do not look back on tbem and lay: 'It was
disgraceful for a man with six lober lenses and a acientific
understanding to let bimself be deluded in that way. I will take
Lamb'a Hyclrodynamics with me next time. 'It is good that there
should be such moments for os. ure would be stunted and narrow
if we could feel no significance in the world 'around UI beyond thal
which can be weighed and measured witb the toola of tbe pbysicilt
or described by the metrical symbols of the mathematieian2•
2Sir A. S. Eddington. The Nature ofthe Physical World. London: J.M. Dent and
Sons (Eve~an's Ubrary Edition, 1935, pp. 304-305.
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Eddington suggests here. that the business of life will draw
ane's attention now to tbe scientific side of things, now to the poetic;
there is 00 thought that tbe two functions will be exercised by'
different people, or belong in tbe life of the same person to separate
periods, say youth and maturity.
Critics are fO,nd of chopping great thinkers into two, the early
and the late, and tbis is nearly always misleading, as the mo~lobvious
examples sbow (Marx, Wittgenstein, and Sartre com~/ ·immediately
to mind). Same people have tried to do tbis with Bachelard, as if he
turned from science to poetry, but even the ,sequence of published
works is more complicated than that. If it is necessary to identify
periods there are at least four, the first two overlapping: 1) an initial
preoccupation with scientific thought, from Essai sur Ja connaissance
approchee (1928) to La philosophie du non (1940); 2) the working
through of a theory of the elements and the corresponding forms of
the imagination, from La psychanalyse du (eu (1938) to La terre et les
reveries du repos (1948); 3) a reconsideration of the thought
processes of science in the light of a new rationalist epistemology,
which includes Le rationalisme applique (1949), L'activite rationaliste
de la physique contemporaine (1951), and Le materialisme rationnel
(1952), three works that Roch Smith has called a '\rilogy," a view
supported by Bachelard himselP; and 4) the new poetics of the three
last works, La poetique de l'espace (1957), La poetique de la reverie)
and La flamme d'une chandelle (hoth 1961). So at the beginning of
this paper I state my confidence in two kinds of unity: that of
Bachelard's career, and that of the possible embodiment of botb
science and poetry in a single individual that that career exemplified.
In the stacks of the Sterling Library, however, the rest of the
Bachelardian corpus was still in my future. I was reading L'activite
rationaliste for a quite specific reason, namely to advance an inquiry
into the oDtological status of fundamental entities in physics.
Electrons, protons and the rest are never obseIVed directly, so they
remain theoretical constructs; what we obseIVe are the consequences
of interactions in which we suppose them to have participated--
J 'Je 'consid~re que [ces] troia livres ... ont une unit6 de vue.· (Personal
communication: le~ter trom Bachelard dated December 13. 1956).
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bubble cbamber tracks, clicks from Geiger counters--and these
consequences are always macroscopic and more or less familiar. This
is still a topical problem, tbougb not in the fonn of bewilderment
about waves and particles that Eddington dramatized with bis
'\vaviele, • whicb was a wave, as I remember, on Mondays, Wedne-
sdays and Fridays, and a particle on Tuesdays, Thursdays and
Saturdays. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, I would rather be
inclined to say: why did we ever suppose that the habitual images
experience equips os with in the local 'IIat r~gion· of macroscopic
observation would be adequate to remote reaches of physical reality -
tbe microscopic, the cosmological, tbe relativistic? Getting physical
theory right means being ready to leave tbe comforts of the fiat
regi~n, to depart from the simple image.
Now two things about Bachelard seem to me particularly
memorable and important: on the one hand tbe tenacity of bis
rootedness in what I am calling the 'IIat region," the familiar, the
everyday, the down-to-earth, but on the other hand the audacity of his
speculative departures from this solid base, his persistence in
following bis arguments where they lead, whether into tbe gloom of
psychoanalytic deptbs or tbe vertigo of relativistic speed and distance.
The polarity of bis work between science and poetry is, as I have
already noted, notorio05; I find no less remarkable the polarity
between the postman and the philosopher. On the whole it seems to
me that it would be a good thing for more philosophen to have been
postmen. The metier may not be accidental: apart from the letter-
seales Bachelard refers to as having given him bis idea of weight,
there is a bermetic side to the postman's activity • be is tbe point of
eontsct with tOO world beyond, be brings sealed messages from distant
origins, there is no knowing what malVels or portents tbey may not
contain; at the same time nothing can surprise him, he is the very
image of persistence and reliability, of local intimacy and homely
order. And when the postman bimself leaves for tbe outside world--
for Dijon, for Paris--he takes with him this imperturbable sense of the
familiar, and his cancern continues to be with the firm materiality of
the world, now from the s~ientific point of view.
It is, however, the point of view of a new science, a "nouvel
esprit seientifique"one ofwhose effects is gradually to undermine that
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materiaiity. The old seience, beginning with Galileo, say, made its
object the mathematical representation of observable relations;
Newton added the modern concept of force, but that had its own
familiar "representation in museular effOrl. Microscopes and teles-
capes, ete., merely extended the Oat region, they did not lead outside
it. It was towards the end- of the nineteenth century that the existence
of entities hitherto unsuspected, with entirely new properties, began
to force itself on scientific attention. The electron was discovered
when Bachelard was eleven, and he was a young man during the
heady days 8t the beginning of the century when relativity and
quantum theory were undergoing their dramatic development from
marginal conjectures to fundamental disciplines of physics.
The initial reaction to the opening of these new domains was
sometimes overdone, and Bachelard did not escape the temptation to
which so many of his contemporaries succumbed of making a mystery
out of the absence of an imaginable substantiality at the quantum
level. In Le nouveJ espritscientitique he says:
Instead of attaching properties and forces directly to tbe electron
we sbal1 attach quantum numbers to it, and on tbe basis of the
distribution of these numbers we sball deduce tbe distribution oftbe
placca of tbe eleclron in tbe atom and tbe molecule. The sudden
dissolution of realism sbould be clearly understood.... Thus
cbelllistry, wbich was for a lang time tbe 'substantialist' science par
excellence, finds the knowledge of ita own matter progressively
dissolving. If. we judge the object according to thc proofB of its
objectivity, we mUSl say thattbe object ja matbematizing itself and
that it manifests a singular convergence of experimental and
matbematical proof. The metaphysical Bulf between mind and the
external world, so unbridBeable for a metaphysics of immediate
intuition, seems less wide for a discursive ~etaphysics that attempts
to follow scientific progress. We ean even conceive of a veritable
displacement of tbe real, a purging of realism, a metaphysical
SUblimation of matter. Reality first transforms itself into a
mathematical realism, and then mathematical realism comes to
dissolve itself in a sort of realism of quantum probabilities. The
pbilosopher who follows the discipline of the quanta - tbe schola
quantorum4 - allows himself to think thc whole of the real in its
mathematical organization, or hetter, he accustoms himself to
4 The scola cantorum ia a well-known school of music in Paris.
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measure the real metapb)'lically in terms of tbe possible, in a
direction 8trictly the invene of realist thought. Let us then express
tbil double lupremacy of Dumberl over thingl and of tbe probable
over number. by a polemlcal formula: cbemical lubstance i. only
tbe Ibadow of 8 Dumber (fombre cfUIJ lJombreY
This is terribly confused. It is simply misleading to suggest that there
are numbers in the objective world and that they somehow replace a
materiality that has dissolved away. If the world ever was material,
it has not ceased to be so just because we can't picture its materiality.
Before, we could have a pictorial representation as weil BS a
mathematical one; now we ean manage only the mathematics, but it
is 00 more constitutive of the world than in the former case. The
epistemological basis of science is still in ordinary macroscopic
objects; our immediate world is still Euclidean and Newtonian; but we
have learned that the rough-and-ready world-picture of tbe Oat
region, with its colors and sounds, its solids and spaces, is inadequate
for the representation of basic physical truths.
What gets in tbe way of a relaxed and uncömplicated accep-
. tance of tbis limitation seems to be a need on our part to have an
image of matter. It is difficult to attribute reality, materiality, or
substance to the world there physically is without attributing to it tbe
imaginative contents that have hitherto accompanied these ideas.
There is no way of getting rid of these imaginative contents but their
existence poses a problem for scientific understanding. The fact that
La formation de }'esprit scienti6que aod La psychanalyse du feu were
published in the same year is not accidental: in the former Bachelard
is concerned not only with tbe proper formation of tbe scientific mind
but also with tlte fact that it is deformed by its habitual expectations,
while in tbe latter he looks at a particular case, the habitua)
association of substantiality and fire. 1n this book when we talk of
our personal experience we are demonstrating human errors, •he says,
in the ."Introduction" to La psychanalyse du [eu, and he continues:
Our work ia offered, tben, as an example of that special
psychoanalysis that we believe would form 8 useful basis for all
S Gaston Bachelard. Le nouvel esprilscienlilique. (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de Franee, 1934), pp. 79-82.
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objective studie... It is an illustration of the seneral lbesea pUl
forward in our recent book, La formalion de tesprit scieIJlitique.
The pedagogy of lCientific instruction would be improved if we
could demonstrate elearl)' bow tbe fascination exerted b)' tbe object
distort8 ilJduCliolJs. It would not be difficult to write about water, air,
eartb, salt, wine and blood in tbe aame wa)' tbat we bave dealt witb
fire in tbis brief outline. ... If we 8ucceeded in inspirins any
imitators, we ahould urge them to study, trom tbe same point of
view as a psycboanalysis. of objective knowledge, the notions of
totality, of system, of element, evolution and development....In all
these examplea one would find beneatb tbe theories, more or leu
readily accepted by 8cientiatl and pbilosopbers, convictions tbat are
often ingenuous. These unquestioned convictions are 80 man)'
extraneoos ßaahea that bedevil tbe proper illumination tbat tbe
mind most build up in an)' project of diacursive reason. Everyone
should aeek to destro)' witbin himself tbese blindly accepted
convictions. Everyone must learn to escape trom tbe rigidity of tbe
mental babits formed by contact witb familiar experiences.
Everyone must destro)' even more carefully than his pbobiaa, bis
'philias,' bis ~mplacent acceptance of first intuitions.'
It is clear from this passage, among other things, that Bachelardts
project at this time was a full-fledged deconstructionism avant la
lettre.
There are, now two directions in which the Bachelardian work
must obviously go - toward the dissolution of the scientific image. and
toward the exploration ofwhat this turn uncovers, namely the richness
of the material image in its own right, and not just as an obstacle to
scientific understanding. What led to the other works on the
elements was just the realization, which dawned after (but no doubt
as a result of) the writing of La psychanalyse du leu, that the domain
of the imagination has its own constructive materiality '. The former
direction is taken in La philosophie du non, and leads from the image
to the concept, not now as a mathematized abstraction but as a
postul~ted object more real than anything merely imaginable. lust as
'Gaston Bachelard, tr .. Alan c. M. Ross. The Psychoana/ysis ofFile. (New York:
Beacon Press, 1964), pp.S-6.
1 Personal communication (see note 3 above)"Quand j'ai ~crit le Feu je oe me
rendais pas compte du rOle de I'imagination mat6rieUe".
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in surrealism (in which Bachelard at this time was deeply interested,
to such a degree that Breton called him "the philosopher of
surrealism ") the domain of the everyday is transcended, by an appeal
to the unconscious, towards the poetically malVelous, so in
Bachelards's "surrationalism 11 the familiar image is transcended, by an
appeal to critical reason, towards the physically fundamental.
In one way or another what il cut away from the image hai to be
found in the reetified concept. We could therefore lay that the
atom la exact1y tbe lum of the criticisma to whicb itl firlt image bai
been lubmitted. Coherent knowledse is a product not of
· architectonic reason but of polemical reason. By ita dialectics and
its criticisms, lurrationalism in a certain waydetermines a lurobject.
The aurobject ia the result of a critical objectification, of an
objectivity that preserves of tbe object only what it bai eriticized.
As it appears in contemporary microphysics the atom is the very
paradigm [type] of the surobject. ·In its relations witb images, tbe
surobject is exactly the non-image. ]ntuitions are very useful: tbey
are good for destroyins. In destroying its first imases, 8cientific
thought discovers its orsanie laws. The schema for the atom
proposed by Bohr a quarter of a century aga hai in this sense
behaved tUte a good image: nothiDg remains of 11.'
(I translate "surobjet" as "surobject" rather than as
"superobject" to maintain consistency with "surrealism" - and bence
"surrationalism" - even though it is a rebarbative term. The use of
this 'preflX in recent thought presents same interesting contrasts:
"Ueberich" in German becomes "surmoi" in French but ~uperego"in
English, which seems right - but if "surrealisme" had by the same
token become 'kuperrealism" I cannot help feeling that the unders-
tanding of the"' movement would have been very different, perhaps
indeed improved.)
But if for science nothing remains of the image, the images
that nevertheless remain lose nothing of their poetic value. Since this
. is the aspect of Bachelard's thought that has become the most
familiar, I can afford to dispense with a catalogue of what those
• Gaston Bachelard. La philosophie du non. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1940), p. 139.
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images are and concentrate on some problematic aspects, with the
remark however that if he had done nothing but identify the species
of the material imagination that would have been enough to establish
him as one of the century's seminal figures in the domain of poetics.
It is perhaps not without significance that this work had its origins in
a therapeutic situation, the psychoanalysis of fire described in an
earlier citation.
Fire is the least material of the elements, and its elemental
status is the most obviously unscientific. If we ask what fire is, the
scientific response is quite straightforward: it is the hot and therefore
visible gaseous product of an exothermic chemical reaction, usually
one of oxidation; and this is as far as it could possibly be from the
poetic response, in which it is warmth, passioq, domesticity, life. The
two poles do not interfere. What this means is that it is relatively
easy to perform the required psychoanalysis; we are not really aux
priseswith materiality (indeed as remarked above the material imagi-
nation is not in play at the time of La psychanalyse du [eu). However
85 Bachelard works through the elements things get stickier, as it
were, and by the time of La lerre et les reveries de la volonle there
is a kind of collision of matter and imagination that seems to
compromise the distinction between science and poetry.
... before tbe spectacle of fire, water, sky, reverie that looks for
substance under ephemeral aspects was in no way blocked by
reality. We really confronted a problem of imagination; it was a
matter precisely of dreaming a profound substance for tbe fire, so
livelyand so brigbtly colored; it was a matter of immobilizing, faced
with running ~ater, the substance of this fluidity; finally it was
necessary , before tbe counsels of lightness given os by breezes and
ßight, to imagine in ourselves tbe very aubstance of this lightness,
the very substance of aerial liberty. In abort materials no doubt
real, but mobile and inconstant, required to be imagined in deptb,
in an intimacy of substance and force. ~ut with the substance of
the eartb, matter brings with it so many positive experiences, the
form is so evident, so striking, so real, that it is hard to see how to
give body to reveries touching the intimae)' of matter. As
Baudelaire says: wThe more positive and solid matter ia in
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appearancc. tbe more lubtle and laborious ia tbe task of tbe
imagination-'.
The resolution of this conflict is to be found in the admission
that the substantiality ofearth is just as imaginary as the substantiality
of any other elements - that is, material and imagination belong
together on the side of poetry, neither has anything to do with
science. To the question whether images of density, hardness,
massiveness, substantiality, etc. tell us anything at all about how the
physical world really is, the brutal answer is Nq. They tell os about
our world, with its vertigo and its viscosity, hut not about the world
science has to deal with. This doetrine is hard to accept because we
want seience to be about ordinary objects, not "surobjects ..
inaccessible to 08, or accessible only through the operations of reaSOD,
and beca08e as Bachelard says the impression ofcontact with the real
material of things is so strong. But science is under the role of reason
and it does compel us to conclude that the physical world is beyond
the reaeh of the material imagination; and Bachelard believes that
tbis conclusion has to be accepted aceording to what he calls
tbe cogito of mutual obligation. (which). in its simplest form. ahould
be expressed aa folIows: I think you are goinS to think wbat I have
just been thinking, if I inform you of tbe episode of reasan wbich
·has just oblised me to think beyond whal I previously tbought.10
What we have to "think beyand" is, once again, the image. It '
is not just images of materiality that are suspect; in contemporary
physics nothing is given to the imagination, not even something
'bidden" - what there is seems less discovered than invented. In the
works of the trilogy "surrationalism" gives way to "applied
rationalism, .. a 'more modest way of handlingthe same problem, and
tbe atoms of an earlier citation from La philosophie du non have
heen generalized into particles, but the message, though expressed
differently, is by now familiar:
, Gaston Bachelard. La lette el les r~veties de la volont~. Essai Bur timagination
des fOtces~ (Paris: J. Corti, 1948): 2.
10 Gaston Bachelard. Le tationalisme appJiqu~. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1949), p. 58
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Particles are situated at the boundary between invention and
discovery, just where we thint applied rationalism ia active. They
are precisely ·objects· of applied ralionaUsm. Wben we Itudied
matter in an attempt to resume it in its four elements, in its fou.r
kinds of atom, .phenomenology offered leductive images: lire has a
spark, water a drop, eartb has a srain, air can be feit in tbe
movement of dust. Here, nothins. No natural ·corpuscularisation!
Nothins, absolutely notbins in common knowledge that could set UI
on the track of the isolation of a particle. And all the images are
deceptive.11
By now the point seems sufficiently established. Yet there is
something unsatisfactory about it even from the scientific point of
view. It is as if, in looking for the truth about the world, which is now
to be expressed in formal rather than materially imaginistic terms, we
bad somehow forgotten that it was theree The parts of the world - its
particles - are yielded only by the application of reason and only when
I am attending to them with a certain concentration of thought and
from a particular point of view. But all the while the rest of the
world is there, as it were peripherally; I can't, precisely, be attending
to it, and yet its being there is a condition of my having anything to
attend to in tbe first place.
In a remarkable paper delivered to a philosophical congress
in Lyon in 1939 Bachelard speaks of '\he idea of the Universe [which]
presents itself as the antithesis of the idea of tbe object," and
introduces the lapidary formula: 'The Universe is tbe infinite of my .
inattention." The truth about objects has to be complemented by the
presence of the world, immediately and globally; . our sense of this
presence is matter of intuition rather than of knowledge, it comes not
from tbe accumulation of facts but from a kind of phenomenological
totalization.
Experience of tbe Universe, if we admit that thisconcept has a
sense, prepares no multiplication of thought; as far as I am
concerned tbe idea of the Universe immediately aod definitely
dialectizes my objective tbought. It breaks my thought. The I think
the world ends for me with the conclusion: therefore I am not.'
11 -Et toutes les images sont trompeuses.- Gaston Bachelard. L'activit6 rationaJiste
de la physique contemporaine" (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951): 87.
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]n other words tbe 1 'hink Ibe warlcl puta me outside Ibe warlcl.
Meditate on tbe other band on tbe axiom of tbe pbilosopberof tbe
universe: everythins ia in everytbins. Listen to bim ains. Iike a
poet, bis EinfuhlUßg amons tbe forms and tbe liaht, tbe breaths and
tbe perfumes. Look at bim in bis paradoxical attitude: it ja in
openins bis arms that he embracea tbe world! Dut - atranse
conclusion - this Universe that lotalizea all qualities keeps none of
lhem as a specific quality. Or al least if it does keep one one soon
sees that it ia only the valorization of a reverie.l2
This is where the image comes back ioto its OWD. The quality
of the Universe is in effect the quality of the moment of my
apprehension of it, not now with scientific concentration but with
poetic openness; it is the product of the non-specific awareness that
Bachelard calls reverie, waking but not active, alert but not
intentional. The image, specifically the literary image, offers os tbis
kind of relation to the world, or rather offers us a new content for it.
Literature is significant, and its significance derives in part from its
lending new significance to the world. In Bachelard this process goes
through ,three stages, in which the image is first directly signifying,
then metaphorical, and finally a creator of its own "unreality.11 The
first is fouod in L'air cl les sanges:
How can we forget tbe sigoifying action oftbe poetic image? The
SigD bere is not areminder, a memory, tbe indelible mark of a
distant paste To deserve tbe title of literary image it bas to have the
merit of originality. A literary image ia a sense in the state of beins
born; the word - the old word - comes to receive trom il a new
signification. But this is not yet enousb: tbe literary image must
enricb itself with a new oneirism. To signify somelhins othert and
to make for other dreams, such is the double function of the literary
image13 •
'To make für other dreams I~ it is not that we needed the
image to have dreams in the first place, to live the reverie that yields
the Universe in the mode of presence rather than (scientific) truth,
12 Gaston Bachelard. ·Univers et r~alit~: Textes des communications du IIe
Congres des Soci~tEs de Philosophie. (Lyon, 1939): 63-65.
13 Gaston BacheJard. L'air et les sanges: Essai sur (imagination du mouvement.
(Paris: J. CorU, 1943) : 283
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but it offers us a renewal of that presence under a different sign.
However the relation bctween signs that this originality of the literary
image generates is nothing other than metaphor, aod some years
later, in this passage from La lerre eI/es r~veries du repos, Bachelard
suggests that poetry giv~ a~ through its metaphoric shifts to
something like a true dream, a truth of its own:
In 811 its objects, Nature dreama. From tbis point, if we faitbfully
follow tbe alchemical meditation ofa cbosen lubstance, a lubstance
alwaya gsthered in Nature, we arrive at this convietion oftbe image
which is poetically lalutary, which provel to U8 that poetry ja not a
same, but ratber a force of nature. It elucidates the dream of
things. Thus we understand that it i. the true metllphor, the doubly
true metaphor: true in its experience and true in its oneiric
thrust.t4
The imagination here, however, is still as Bacon might have
said 'bung with weights, "held down in this as in the other book about
the earth (cited above) by the evident reality of the material,
convinced by its experience rather than freely adventuring. It is only
in the period of the last poetics that the imagination is given apower
of its OWD, liberated not only from the burden of experience but from
metaphor itself. Thus in La poetique de /'espace Bachelard says:
Academic psychology hardly deals with the IUbject of tbe poetic
image, wbich is often mistaken for simple metapbor. Generally, in
-fact, the ward image, in the works of psychologista, Is surrounded
with confusion: we lee images, we reproduce images, we retain
images in our memory. The image ia everything except a direct
product of the imagination....
I propose, on the contrary, to consider tbe imagination aa a major
power of human nature. To be sure, there is notbing to be gained
by sayins that the imagination is tbe faculty of producins images.
But this lautology has at least the virtue of putting an end to
comparisons of images with memories.
By the swiftness of its actions, the imagination separates us trom tbe
past aa weil as from reality; it faces tbe future. To tbe tunetion of
reality, wise in experience of the past, Ibould be added a tunetion
1. Gaston Bachelard.. La terre et les r8veries du repos. Essai Bur fimagination de
rintimit6. (Paris: J. Corti, 1948): 323..
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ofunreality, wbieb iI C4jually positive, BI I tried to abow in certaiD
of my earlier workau.
Such a 'function of unreaiity· is clearly incompatible with
scientific truth, whose cancern must in the end be with the real even
if on the way to its formulations it passes through the philosophie d~
non. But it is not incampatible with presence, especially if we
construe the prae of praesens as temporaDy before; the future is
axiomatically unreal, but it is the task of the imagination to face it,
not in the mode of knowledge and the determination of parts but in
the mode of creativity and transcendence towards the whole. So
Bachelard quotes with approval these words of Jean Lescure:
"Knowing mus! be accompanied by an equal capacity to forget
knowing. Non-knowing is not a form of ignorance but a difficult
transcendence of knowledge. This is the price that must be paid for
an oeuvre to be, at all times, a sort of pure beginning, which makes
its creation an exercise in freedom 1'16.
The poetic presence to the world that is always a pure
beginning transcends scientific knowledge but does not thereby be-
liule or annul it. I revert now to the duaiity from which I began,
between science and poetry, in the light of Bachelard's itinerary. We
left the truth about the real, some pages back, in the care of a strictly
unimagJnabJe but mathematically compelling "applied rationalism, "in
order to pursue the power of the image towards an immediate pres-
ence to being. This presence is characterized in La poetique de
J'espace as apossession of the subject by the image, as a reverb-
eration that constitutes a 'Veritable awakening of poetic creation ... in
the soul of the reader 1'17. These two extremes--on the one hand
mathematics with no image at all, on the other an image that fills the
whole space of subjectivity.,.~eemto stand in complete opposition to
one another, to have nothing in common. For Bachelard however (as
U Gaston Baebelard, tr. Marialolas. The PoelicsofSpace. (Boston: Beacon Press,
1969): p. xxx.
l' Op.eit., pp. xxviii-xxix.
11 Op.Cil., p. xix.
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for Eddington) tbey are clearly not'opposites but complementaries.
It may be helpful in closing to consider their complementarity through
the mediation of language.
Language is a common resource of science and of poetry, but
tbe roles it respectively plays in tbem illustrate at once their
separation and their continuity. Language--the language of logie and
of matbematics--is the only medium we have for representing the
trutb about objective pbysical reality, inaccessible a,s it is to the
imagination. On tbe other hand language is incapable of representing
the immediacy of presence, whi~b is yielded only by tbe imagination,
althougb in poe.try it can as it were prep~re tbe imagination for
presence. Language, in Heidegger's terms, is "the hause of Being,"by
which we are to understand that if we make (poiein) a place for
being, by means of poetry, Being may come to dweil in it. Presence
to Being however is not linguistic, it is not the same as presence to .. _
poetry - the latter is merely propaedeutic to it. Bachelard seems tti
have bad an independent understanding of this in his doctri.!le of tbe
reverberation of the poetic image, tbe image that 'b~.; töuched the
depths before it stirs the surface ''18.
These two functions--the discursive ground of science that is
constituted by language and the unspoken intentionality ofpoetry tbat
is prepared by it--are botb eminently human functions. The subject
does not vacillate between them but occupies their intersection, an
intersection that i,s not a point but a place, the place where our life,
witb all its scientific complexity and poetic intensity, takes place.
What Bachelard reminds us, in his person no less than in his writings,
is that tbe complexity and the intensity are departures from, and
equally rooted in, the familiar materiality of the simple image; that,
given a willingness to do the necessary work, whether rational or
imaginative, scientific truth and poetic presence are botb accessible,
to postmen as to philosophers.
The George Washington University
t1lbid.
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